Revolt of the Generals, Part 2.

I once had a nodding acquaintance with a military brass hat, a Navy Admiral, who rose to flag rank during the late – unlamented – Clinton administration. He spent most of his years prior to retirement in the role of a uniformed diplomat, touring the world and hobnobbing with its leaders.

He once captained a “boomer” and later ran part of the US submarine fleet, but his reaction to 9/11 was one of passivity. I had lunch with him after 9/11 and he was vehemently opposed to military action in Afghanistan. He was a political Admiral and I sometimes wondered if a nuclear war had ever broken out, he would have done his duty. Knowing him as I did, I would not have been sure.

The challenge Donald Rumsfeld and the Bush administration faced, once the "end of history" post-Cold-War peace had ended was to re-create the US military. The military they inherited was a superb weapon for fighting the Soviets. But the Soviets has been cast onto the “dust heap of history.” And the Afghans had shown how effective irregular forces were against Cold-War style military tactics and formations when they drove the Soviet army out of their country.

The lessons we learned from Soviet mistakes allowed us to take over Afghanistan with few troops in short order. We were able to overcome Saddam’s vaunted Republican Guard and his regular army in a matter of weeks. But the transformation is incomplete and we are being taught painful lessons as we battle irregulars in Afghanistan, Iraq and other – less publicized – battlefields.

This is why the transformation must take place faster and under the pressures of war. But there a few better places and times to learn the art of war than during a war.

The political brass that headed the military under the Clintons don’t see it that way. Reprentative John Murtha, retired Marine Colonel, believes that Clinton showed how it should be done when he abandoned Somalia after the Blackhawk Down episode. He is serious when he proposes Somalia as the model of US action in a terror riven world.

Jed Babbin was a deputy undersecretary of defense in the George H.W. Bush administration and he has written an article in Real Clear Politics (Reviving the Generals revolt) that anticipates part 2 of the Revolt of the Generals. The first act took place last April when:

… six retired generals, each of whom had been promoted to significant rank under the Clinton administration, publicly criticized the president's handling of the Iraq war and - some clearly and some in muddled terms - demanded the firing of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

To give it coherence and spell it out for the general public:

On April 16, in the midst of what he labeled a "military revolt," former Clinton UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke wrote a Washington Post op-ed that characterized the generals' mini-revolt as, "the most serious public confrontation between the military and an administration since President Harry S. Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur."

That little rebellion was quickly forgotten, but

But now the next chapter of the generals' revolt is about to be published. Washington Post reporter Tom Ricks's new book, "Fiasco: The American Adventure in Iraq" will be released in less than three weeks. From the publicity surrounding it we can conclude that Holbrooke did leak a big Dem political op, and that Blankley may have been prescient in thinking to apply the Uniform Code of Military Justice to any active duty officers involved.

But who are these Generals, and what is their apparent motive? Don’t be surprised if one if them is General Eric Shinseki.

The least public and most political general is former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki. When Rumsfeld took over the Pentagon, his orders were to shake the military out of its Cold War mindset and strategies. According to one source (who was an active duty army officer when he told me this) Shinseki tried to make Rumsfeld an offer he couldn't refuse: Shinseki would make Rumsfeld look good on Capitol Hill if Rumsfeld would leave the Army alone and not force it out of its Cold War garrison-force mentality. Rumsfeld didn't take the bait, and instead treated Shinseki gently, allowing him to retire with dignity instead of firing him. And then Rumsfeld went about building a better team made up of war-fighting generals who could transform the force under fire.

It is almost impossible to over-estimate the strength with which a bureaucracy can fight change. And while I have the greatest respect for the men and women who are putting their lives on the line in the desert sands, I realize that as men advance up the ladder, they must become politically astute. And sometimes, for reasons that all humans share, the climb is and end in itself – the old ways are the best ways – and I am sure that those who were replaced or found themselves on the outside looking in when a new administration came to town resent it mightily. And we will hear more from them. It may be hard to believe that there is a contingent of military leaders that look to the Somalia model as the prototype of American reaction to banditry and terror, but don't be. The Clintons loathed the military, and only those who shared their world view rose during that administration.