The al Qaeda Identity

Much is being made of the activities – or lack of activities – of al Qaeda. There can be no question of this group’s existence. But unlike more formal organizations, a member of al Qaeda does not come with self identifying marks, like members of conventional military organizations which it most closely resembles.

There is no al Qaeda badge (“We don’t need no stinkin’ badges”), no uniform, no dog tag. As a result, al Qaeda’s presence or absence can be debated endlessly.

Its hallmark is supposed to be technical sophistication in carrying out attacks against its targets. And it has had its spectacular successes. Those attacks which do not succeed such as the London car bombings of recent vintage are suppose to not be al Qaeda’s doing because they lack the spectacular success of events such as those carried out on 9/11.

But is sophistication really the signature of al Qaeda?

Let’s imagine that the US security services had been able to penetrate the 9/11 conspiracy and stop the attacks. What could have been the conclusion of those who imagine the al Qaeda perpetrators are terrorist supermen? In the absence of the end result, we would have seen a sorry group of young men with no weapons and a rudimentary knowledge of piloting. Box cutters? What can you do with box cutters? Slash the face of a few passengers, perhaps?

Are al Qaeda’s methods and sophistication really any more complex than Tim McVeigh, the loner who brought down the Murrah Building with a rented Ryder truck, fertilizer and fuel oil?

al Qaeda’s danger lies not in its sophistication. In fact, its plots and their execution are relatively simple. Its danger lies in the appeal of its ideology. Despite the fact that its ideology is ages old, it has the appeal of the most modern 20th century totalitarian systems: it answers the question of what we are here for. And beyond that it provides a promise of an after-life that other totalitarian systems like Communism and Fascism never did, making its adherents welcome death as they strive to kill their opponents.

Those who see the treat of al Qaeda and the ideological web that it spins as a law enforcement problem fail to realize the total difference between the criminal and the al Qaeda adherent. The criminal tries to evade capture. The criminal can be deterred by the possibility of arrest or imprisonment. The Al Qaeda adherent does not fear either capture of imprisonment. Imagine trying to arrest pickpockets or thieves who will gladly blow themselves up in order to take the arresting officers with him?

Further, the al Qaeda adherent does not believe he is committing a crime. They are fighting the good fight for Allah. They cannot be persuaded to change and follow the “straight and narrow” because in Jihad that is exactly what they are doing.

The essential problem with those who try to fit al Qaeda’s adherents into constructs with which they are familiar is that they won’t fit. They are not soldiers because they don’t wear uniforms. They are not criminals because as they kill us they are doing Allah’s will. Our 19th and 20th Century rules for handling these situations don’t apply, and attempts to make them apply blind us to the 21st century reality.

We don’t need no stinkin’ badges and we don’t care what your laws say. But we know what your rules are and we will use your rules to kill you. Until you learn the rules of this new war.